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ー1特別寄稿 I
. Literatures, Histories, and Literary Histories 
Earl Miner, Princeton University 
The thesis held in common for al three topics in my title is that they must be 
considered pluralistically, something more easily presented in English than in Japanese. 1 
The fact that English is a language whose nouns have easy plurals and Japanese is 
not shows that the languages of the world are far from being codes like Celsius and 
Fahrenheit, which can be mathematically transformed into each other. Since the lan-
guages vary, the literatures do also, even if there is also the opposite danger of thinking 
the differences between languages and their literatures more radical than they are. That 
matter is one to return to. 
Even within a single language-culture, we must think pluralistically. Ideas of 
English literature・have'・varieo" from the wide sense of what is written-literatura,. 
letters-to the narrow sense of a normative or elitist canon. The modern idea of literature 
-as a separate body of fine writing distinct from other kinds of composition-血 1erged
in the eighteenth century. Of course there were precursive conceptions. In the Renais-
sance there was a conception of literature as that consisting of narrative (epic), drama, 
and lyric, an idea first expressed in England by Milton. Similar matters exist in respect 
to Japanese literature. In a well known study, Watsuji Tetsuro's "Nihon Bungei to 
Bukkyo Shiso, " the preface accounts for differences between "bungak.u" and''bungei" 
(roughly speaking, literary study and literary art). In Japan as in China, "bun" (Ch. 
"wen") originally referred to, encompassed, lyric and certain kinds of history. Japan 
more quickly added fresh kinds of writing to what was normatively considered "bun": 
prose narratives like the Genji Monogatari and, later, serious linked poetry, r, 切 ga.
Japan differs from China in also adding valued kinds of drama, nlJ and kyiJgen. On 
the other hand, certain kinds of writing were excluded from normatively considered 
"bun. " The exclusion was les rigorous than in China, but only in recent times has 
that haikai linked poetry of Basho and Buson been added to the canon of genuine 
literature, along with the dramatic forms of jiJruri and kabuki. The prose of about 1600 
to 1860 has been the last to be added, and even today there are some who express 
reservations over the inclusion of some of the less serious prose, even if Saikak.u would 
be included by al. On the other hand, we discover in dictionaries something termed 
joryabungaku (literature by women). There is. no.danryt珈mgaku(literature by men), 
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since literature supposedly was written by men-by definition. That would have surprised 
the Japanese divinities. It flies in the face of the fact that Princess Uchiko was the 
greatest poet in Japan during the :first half of the ninth century. And of course Murasaki 
Shikibu is the author of the greatest work in the language. These parodoxes and aberra-
tions of literary history are, however, to be found in every country. 
The terms being used here—"English literature," "Chinese literature," and "Japanese 
literature"―are_ not entirely correspondent. English literature・is not simply something 
written in English, since it excludes American and Commonwealth writing. According 
to the definer, it may or may not include literature in Scots, but it almost certainly 
will include the Scottish Chaucerians. It includes Latin poetry by Milton, but it excludes 
what (most) foreign visitors have written in English while in England. Chinese literature 
has been for centuries what . was written by the dominant Han (J. "kan") people or in 
their kinds and in Chinese by foreigners, especially Koreans, when resident in China. 
A typical Chinese dynastic collection like The Complete T, 叩 gPoems (J. Ze叫 '1shi)
includes poems by male poets designated solely by name and then by others following 
within decreasingly respected categories : priests, women, barbarians. Eighty-five per 
cent of extant classical Korean poetry is said to be in Chinese, but the Chinese do not 
seem to think poetry is Chinese unless it was written in China. Today Chinese litera-
ture has 0other tolerated literatures, those of its minority peoples like the Miao. 
Very few literary histiorians bother to consider what their subject is. Konishi 
Jin'ichi, author of a five-volume Nihon B四 geishi,is an exception. In the "Josetsu" to 
his first volume, he asks : "What is Japan?" "What is literature (bungei) ?" And、'What
is history?" We need not agree with al his answers, but the responsibility shown is 
perhaps unprecedented. Like other Japanese, Konishi is inclined to think language the 
determining factor: if it is written in Japanese, it must be Japanese literature. He 
goes so far as to include Ainu and Ryukyuan literature. There is also a Japanese 
tendency to accept as Japanese literature some things written in other languages (par-
ticularly Chinese, of course) when written on Japanese・soil. 
As these few examples show, we must speak of literatures pluralistically, because 
our thoughts and actions show that we so assume and behave. The great danger in 
doing so, however, is that we may be led to presume that a definition current in a given 
country is the proper, inevitable, only one. Europeans have sometimes argued that Japan 
and China have no true epic or tragedy, and that therefore those literatures are inferior. 
Until recently, Chinese have seen nothing but barbarians around them. Japanese often 
think that their language is not only different but spiritually special, unavailable (with 
its literature) to foreigners. Each of these assumptions is essentially chauvinistic and 
unworthy of rational opposition. Instead, we should feel humility . atthe varieties of 
the literatures and our ignorance of al but a fraction of what exists. 
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As with our conceptions of literatures, so must our conception of histories be plural. 
There are two reasons, one quite obvious, the other not only less obvious but far more 
dificult. Obviously there are m,ultiple histori~of the same matters, numerous histories 
of Japanese literature. The more difficult matter involves the meanings attached to 
"history," as in the phrase, "the history of Meiji Japan" (or of Meiji literature). 
"History" designates two quite different meanings in such phrases. One involves events, 
Meiji happenings presumed actually to have occurred-what writing seeks to describe, 
to present, or to narrate. The second sense of "history" is precisely that other written 
version: the description, the presentation, the narration. We may distinguish the two 
histories in terms of history as event and history as account. 
Events occur, happen, whether they are recorded or not. H no account of them is 
made, we know nothing of them. Beyond a century or two ago, events become dim. 
Of the greatest writers in Japanese and English, Murasaki Shikibu and Shakespeare, 
we know very litle. On the other hand, with contemporary events, we have opposed 
problems. The events themselves seem much more available, as it were, but there are 
so many accounts that we may be quite unclear as to what really happened. 
These issues involve the most complex discussed here. Although skeptical philo-
sophers say that we have no proof of the real existence of the world, we al presume 
that it exists. Of course our only proof of its existence is our knowledge of it, but 
that is as high as we can aspire to the reality of anything. We may as well say. we 
assume the existence of history as event, because in fact we do so assume. But both 
the assumption and the existence of actual events differ from our knowledge of the 
event. People under a ceヰainage cannot have any direct knowledge of the Second 
World War. Their only access to knowledge of that time comes from history as account— 
from books, films, and so forth. 
The one subject that each of us knows :first-hand and well is our own lives. Our 
memory of ourselves gives us a sense of our own identity, to which al else is other. 
Yet even this most intimate and privileged knowledge is far from perfect. H challenged 
by a policeman to say what we had done just eleven months ago, most of us would 
feel panic and confusion-at least until we looked up the date and consulted our diaries 
and other records. Some few events require no written reminders. We will remember 
witnessing the death of a parent. A woman will remember giving birth to a child. 
Great success or great suffering will remain in our minds. We also know that what 
may be well remembered may be remembered differently by a group of people sharing 
knowledge of an event. Five witnesses to a serious automobile crash will recall some-
what different things. And the world's literary masterpieces are regarded differently 
by their several readers, even while each of the witnesses and each of the readers agrees 
with the others that there was an automobile crash or that the Genji Monogatari is a 
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prose narrative with certain identifiable features. 
We have, then, two basic histories. One is history in the prime sense: what occurred. 
The other is history in the secondary sense: our knowledge of what occurred. That 
knowledge derives to some degree from personal experience of events but to far greater 
degree from reliance on accounts by others. The obstacles to our knowledge belong 
both to our limited capacities to know and to the nature of the evidence available. It 
may be insufficient: the silences of earlier centuries. Or it may be over-abundant: the 
noise of our own times. Whatever the case, almost al that we consider history consists 
of things of which we have no direct knowledge whatever. Rather than know the 
events, we know what has been recorded, what was said or written of them. More 
than that, what we term the Second World War is known to us as history made up of 
earlier histories. Those old enough to remember that war as event know very litle from 
direct experience. All but a fraction of their knowledge derives from accounts: from 
news-paper or radio accounts at the time and from subsequent writings based on layer 
after layer of previous accounts. 
These inescapable facts are of great importance to a consideration of the relation of 
the literatures to the histories. For one thing, there is no insurmountable barrier be-
, tween them. One of the classics of Japanese "diary literature" is the Murasaki Shikibu 
Nikki (The Diary of Murasaki Shikibu). The factual nature of her account can be 
verified in places by non-literary diaries kept by men in a sort of Chinese. On the 
other hand, her diary is also considered to be a source for the Eiga Monogatari (A 
Tale of Flowering Fortunes), a historical work. Unfortunately, we have only portions 
of her diary extant in separate form, but the situation described is accurate. The Heike 
Monogatari (The Tale of the Heike) is yet more complex. The version usually read 
today is a literary version of a complex historical sequence involving the downfall of 
the once triumphant Taira family. Many other versions exist, however, whether in 
Chinese or Japanese, and some are deemed historical rather than literary. On the other 
hand, the familiar version and other stories it influenced have really taken some figures 
out of history. For example, the figure of that ideal of Japanese chivalry, Minamoto 
Y oshitsune, has now become so much a matter of account rather than a real event that 
nobody really knows what his character and life were like. The accounts have super-
seded events. It is not surprising that an early eleventh-century work like Murasaki 
Shikibu's Diary should be fragmentary, lost in silences. It is surprising that for 
Yoshitsune, written about in The Tale of the Heike only two centuries later, there 
should be too much noise, too much writing, and too litle certainty. 
The evidence is not merely Asian. All of us presume that in the eighteenth century 
there occurred the French Revolution, although of course none of us witnessed the 
actual events. As students of English literature, we may derive our knowledge of that 
?
?
ー
???
． ． ?
?
Literatures, Histories, and Literary Histories ?
historical event from literature, fore xample Wordsworth's Prelude ("Bliss was it in that 
dawn to be alive, / But to be young was very Heaven!") or Dickens'Tale of Two 
Cities ("It was the best of times; it was the worst of times."). There is also Carlyle's 
long book, The French Revolution, from which I at least remember litle more than 
the image of a great green wave for the Terror. The three examples show once again 
that we derive our knowledge of actual events not from the events themselves but from 
writing about them. That also shows that we may derive knowledge about actual events 
from literature. Carlyle's example is especially interesting. If we take away the italics 
from his title, we designate actual events. Add the italics and we have an account of 
the events. Not only that. Although formerly considered a history, the work is now 
considered literary. 2 In other words, the distinction between literature and history is 
not as great as the distinction between literature and history on the one hand and actual 
events on the other. 
Of course we do posit a difference between literature and history also. We further 
posit some kind of relation between them. What is that relation ? Two kinds of 
answers have been given, two explanations. One may be termed intellectual or spiritual. 
According to this view, thought determines action ; mind determines reality ; ideas 
determine what happens. What occurs as actual event is caused by the spirit of the 
time, l'esprit du temps, die Zeitgeist. The other explanation may be termed social. 
Now actual events determine literature and other manifestations of thought. Not only 
does action determine thought; reality determines mind; what happens determines ideas. 
According to the familiar Marxist version of this thesis (held also by many of con-
servative mind), the material means of production determine human response. 
If, however, we recall the distinction between the two histories, neither explanation 
satisfies. We presume actual events out of a sense of the actualness of ourselves. That 
presumption of actuality is one that does not depend on our knowledge of it for its 
existence, so that the intellectual account is not tenable as a causal account of reality. 
It does hold as it were in the wake of actuality, however, since actual events are possessed 
by us only as we know them, and for actual events of almost al presumed kinds, our 
knowledge derives from accounts rather than from the events themselves. That in turn 
works against the social explanation, because it posits that what we know is caused by 
what is in actuality, when as we have seen our access to the actual is through our 
knowledge. 
Let us consider an example, the origin of the English novel. The standard account 
relates it to an emergent middle-class readership. The "intellectual" explanation would 
hold that changes in thought brought about social changes, and that the novel is caused 
by the changes in thought. The "social" explanation would hold that changes in actuality 
determined the energence of the novel in England. The intellectual explanation is 
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problematical in assuming that mind may determine prime history, when we presume 
instead that things have existed and do exist even without their being known. The 
social explanation is problematical in offering as a cause what is accessible to us only 
insofar as it is known, something that varies from knower to kn.ower. 
The dilemma is easily enough resolved. The intellectual view cannot exist with-
~ut the premise of the existence of the actual, and the social view could not exist for 
us without being known. In short, we must assume constant relation, interaction. 
There is what may be determed a dialectic between actuality and the known. Moreover, 
the two histories exist in ceaseless interaction. For our purposes, in accounting foi; 
anything, what exists does exist only as it is known, and whatever the problems with 
philosophical realism, what we know provides our sole access to actuality. Features of 
this issue will reappear almost at once as we move to our third topic. 
The literary histories are also plural. They are plural in an obvious sense of being 
multiple for the same phenomena—thirteenth-century waka or English Romantic poetry, 
the Kamakura bakufu or Victorian politics. Whether histories of literature or of social 
matters, al are obviously examples of history as account. They account for literary or 
social events. At the same time, however, these accounts also have the status of events. 
They did occur, and there was a time before which they were not We may refer to 
these literary or social histories therefore as events-accounts. In that they are alike. 
They differ, however, in that a literary history is an event-account of events that are 
writings-accounts of a kind-in the first instance: thirteenth-century waka, Romantic 
poetry. A social history is an event-account of what are, at the beginning, events: the 
Kamakura bakufu, Victorian politics. Actual social events occur and then can be returned 
to no more, as accounts may be, if they are not lost. We can return to a history of 
Kamakura bakufu, but not to the bakufu itself. The object of historical attention has 
ceased to be, and only accounts remain, insofar as they do remain. With the arts, 
however, the object of attention continues to exist (if it does continue), like the history 
of Heian waka or the Kamakura bakufu. Indeed, it has a cognitive status as something 
more than an account. So as to include the other arts as well, we may say that the 
object of literary attention is an expression, whether as a poem or as a work of archi-
tecture. And this expression continues to exist as the basis of primary interest long 
after it was first an event in history, whereas kinds of knowledge other than aesthetic 
normally do not feature the expression itself so much (as the object of attention) but 
rather what is expressed. This difference is only a relative one, but it is a significant 
one nonetheless. 
To the extent that these differences exist and matter, we might assume that a history 
of literature or architecture might, in principle, have some differences from a history of 
German cities during the Reformation. Certainly literary histories must be considered 
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pluralististically. There are many accounts of the same things, whether thirteenth-century 
wa:ka or Romantic lyrics. These poetic expressions (all literary works) differ from 
medieval merchant practices and e紅lyninete血th-centuryadministration of the English 
poor laws. They difer, as we have seen, because from their first appearance・as events 
the・waka and the English lyrics were already expressed knowledge. This clearly relates 
to the fact tl;iat the object of attention in a literary or other history may be the aesthetic 
expression, and to that extent there is bound to be a difference between their histories 
and those of medieval Japanese merchants・or the English poor in Wordsworth's time. 
In practice, however, there may be more of a distinction than a difference. Literary 
historians commonly spend less time talking about -aesthetic expressions-poems, plays, 
narratives-and more on social events; biography, dates of composition and publication, 
sources, and so forth. Very commonly the only major difference is not in the nature 
of the history but simply the label, whether "literary" or "political" or some other. 
There are other considerations-. One is that certain kinds of histories are themselves 
included as・part of literature (bun) from the beginning, whether in Japan, China, or 
Korea. Also, it is noticeable that Japanese at least do not share that taste for closely 
defined and distinct categories that is clear in the West from the time of the Greek 
Academy. Finally, literature differs from the other arts in having a verbal medium, a 
version of natural language, that is shared with many other kinds of knowledge. It is 
easy to exaggerate the practical differences between a history of literature and of many 
other subjects, except of course for the specifics of what 1s accounted for. 
Literary histories are pluralistic on other grounds than the possibility of several 
treating the same topic. In particular, ・they may vary in their handling of periodization. 
We distinguish literary periods for the same reason that we distinguish literary kinds or 
genres : to have units larger than the single particular and smaller than the whole. 
There is no need to discuss whether the medium-range concepts are logically valid or 
whether they are historical and critical fictions. (Presumably the only true history is 
that seen by the mind of God, to which periods, nations, and our other distinctions are 
irrelevant.) The fact is that we do periodize and think that we cannot do without 
periods. Japanese were on to this very early in their literary tradition, at least as early 
as the Kokinsha. Tsurayuki's Japanese preface selects six important poets from the past 
and then compares with them the poets of his age. Even the ko-kin of the title suggest 
a historical distinction. In England, however, the concept of a literary age does not 
explicitly app碑runtil Dryden. One. may say that many of our ancestors led happy, 
useful lives without the concept of a literary period. But one must also say that once 
such a conception is born there seems to be no avoiding its usage. 
In other words, the real problem lies in the logic of periodizing. The discussion 
of the literatures and the histories has made clear that・we cannot say that history is 
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the cause of literature. But what does our periodizing mean? Take the periods of English 
literature. Sometimes we talk of centuries, so postulating that literature (and other 
matters, presumably) change every hundred years after the birth of Christ : a religious 
event is the point of departure. The alternative to centuries is well known. In it the 
first English period is the Middle Ages. It is not clear to me why we begin with a 
middle, or why we should have to use the plural, "Ages," for this period alone. Next 
comes the Renaissance, a word meaning "rebirth. " What was reborn is one thing, and 
another is when that rebirth ended. Years ago somebody wrote that the Middle Ages 
ended with the charting of the Royal Society (1662). More people seem to think that 
the Renaissance ends about then, followed by the Restoration and Eighteenth Century. 
There is no discernible logic to a period characterized by a political event (taken to 
end, apparently, i~1700, fifteen years after the death of the restored king) and then the 
first~entury to help designate a literary period in English. (Italians of course love 
centuries.) Next comes the Romantic period, a now positive term that had once been 
derogatory. Then comes. the Victorian period; the first always named after a monarch. 
Thereafter we move bit by bit to the modern and nowadays to the postmodern. It is 
a mess. 
Chinese and American literary historical periodizing is far neater but-no. more logical. 
The Chinese periodize by reigning dynasties,. as if no poet could differ from other poets 
as long as the Tang (To) dynasty continued, but al poets had to・change overnight 
when the Sung (So) dynasty began. American literature is periodized by wars, appa-
rently on the self-congratulatory assumption that wars occur so seldom for the United 
States that when. they do, literature has a moral obligation to change. Women have 
pointed out that to use wars as defining points is largely to exclude women's writing. 
On the other hand, a recent anthology of women's literature in English designates. al 
before 1800 as a single early unit, which is inappropriate to literature by men. 
The periodizing of Japanese literature is wonderfully rich and strange, since such 
different means have been devised. One is to. use the names of dominant families, so 
that we sometimes hear of Fujiwara literature (more often of aヰ）and frequently of 
Tokugawa literature.・Apart from the inherent illogicality of either by itself or both 
together, those terms leave out al before the Fujiwara, al after the Tokugawa, and al 
between. Another system often enountered periodizes literature according to the seat of 
the capital or of governmental power. Who has not-heard of Heian, Kamakura, Muro-
machi, and so forth? On this view, literature should have changed rapidly before the 
Heian period, since the capital was often moved, whether to・here in Naniwa, there in 
C>mi, or here and there in Yamato、Strangeto say, there is not now a Tokyo literature. 
Instead, we shift periodizing to the reigning monarchs, giving us a Meiji period (forty-
six years), a Taisho period (fourteen years), and a Showa period (sixty two years as 
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of this writing). Meiji Tenno was of course a prolific poet, but he cannot be said to 
dominate literature during his reign. Even if he could have, nobody would think so 
about Taisho Tenno (during whose reign so many fine events occurred). Japanese 
literature is periodized in a third way, which is the most logical of any mentioned so 
far: old or ancient (kodai), medieval (chasei), recent (kindai) and modern (gendai). 
One can foresee a problem of that gendai getting longer and longer, but for the present 
we need not worry. What does cause trouble is the tendency to wish to adjust, as with 
the postulation of a period between ancient and medieval, a kind of old-middle (chako). 
But the most serious difficulty is establishing the bounds of the Middle Ages. That 
period has been stretched back to the eighth century and brought forward to the verge 
of the nineteenth. 
There is not much we can do about period names and their illogicality. We can 
and ought to remind ourselves every Monday morning that period names are labels for 
convenience and without genuine historical explanatory power. Unfortunately, that use-
ful advice will be followed by nobody, including the one who offers it. 
Another problem with literary history involves what may be termed narrative ends, 
where things tend, the logic of historical process. In Japanese literary history one such 
narrative end is the decline of the royal court, which appears to occur from the Jinshin 
no Ran in 672 to the Onin no Ran in 1467. That decline must have been imperceptible, 
since it required eight centuries to occur. An English end is similar in strangeness but 
opposite in tendency. That is the rise of the middle class. In various accounts, the 
middle class is rising in Chaucer's lifetime, and the process seems to have continued to 
the end of the nineteenth century, perhaps the First World War. Perhaps it continues 
yet in "bourgeois" countries. It has certainly taken the risers a long time to get up. 
Then there are the Marxists. For them, history certainly has an end. It begins in 
either a slave period or a feudal period. That is followed by the period of the bourgeiosie 
or capitalism, which is followed by socialism, which will culminate in communism. 
From al appearances, socialism seems likely to defer communism for a period as long 
as the combined decline of the Japanese court and the rise of the English bourgeoisie. 
In any event, it is extremely difficult to discover a bourgeois or capitalist period in the 
past histories of present socialist countries. 
Laughable as our・concepts and terms are, we must recognize that every literary 
historian has some end, even if the fact is denied The most "scientific" historian of 
literature, compiling what is tantamount to a bibliography of authors, dates, and titles has 
precisely a positivistic end. The value of carefully ascertained detail varies not only 
from one historian to the next but also from one culture or nation and one (may I say 
it?) period to another. Positivistic literary history is out of fashion in Europe and 
North America, where the intellectual and ideological are favored. It seems to me that, 
I 
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because of their love of particulars, Japanese continue to find greater appeal in posi・
tivistic history. As evidence I would point to the large number of references books 
(jisho, jiten) produced in Japan. Behind me in my study there are of course English, 
French, German, Greek, and Latin dictionaries, as there are also KiJj虹 anda kanji 
dictionary. But there are also two kogo jiten, a nandoku chimei jiten, a nandoku 
seimei jiten, and a kotoba asobi jiten. On other bookshelves, there stand many other 
useful jit⑰ printed in Tokyo. In our library there are even zuihitsu jiten. And of 
course I have jiten devoted to Japanese history along with those devoted to Japanese 
literature (and its history). 
Clearly, Japanese are devoted to historical writing, seeming to prize every fact 
ascertainable from the past. Even Japanese literature and other arts practiced are his-
torical in a sense that I do not recognize in other literatures. Japanese have not only 
preserved gagaku and books lost in China but also the performance of their own arts. 
It is a kind of miracle that we can see n/J, bunraku, and kabuki performed in lines of 
acting and staging that are unbroken from the past. There are even one or two people 
alive who have practiced Satomura school renga. This is not to mention the many 
groups devoted to composing tanka and haiku. One may almost say that in Japan the 
literatures include their own histories. 
Japan is an appropriate place, then, to raise some issues that have come to feature 
in recent literary debate in the United States. Until a year or so ago, literary study 
was dominated-at least in terms of newsworthy, prestigious study exciting young 
minds—by a theoretical emphasis hostile to historical-understading. Literary theories— 
once again the plural should be stressed-are essential to our study, . I believe, because 
habits of theoretical inquiry enable us to conceptualize far more rigorously, to define 
、whatwe do with greater precision and justice. But the denial of history-of al the 
histories—is, in my view, an intellectual, human betrayal. Our own lives show that to 
understand any of us, it is necessary to know what a given person has lived through, 
and we can only hope that our children and grandchildren will have a history, which 
is to say a future that will become their past. 
There really has been a sudden and profound change in literary thinking in the 
United States. Two years ago Yale dominated the academic literary world, and Decon-
struction dominated Yale. Deconstruction and related literary views are now on the 
defensive. Nobody is more sensitive to changes in literary thought than J. Hillis Miller, 
who was formerly at Yale and who remains a strong proponent of "theory in the sense 
of an orientation toward language as such, " or in other words Deconstruction and 
related ideas. In his speech as president of the Modern Language Association in De-
cember, 1986, he spoke of what "everyone knows. " In fact, few people did in any sense 
of full awareness. Here are some of his words : 
Literatures, Histories, and Literary Histories 11 
As everyone knows, literary study in the past few years has undergone a sudden, 
almost universal turn away from theory in the sense of an orientation toward Ian-
guage as such and has made a corresponding turn toward history, culture, politics, 
institutions, class and gender conditions—8 
Why should such a change have taken place? 
There are many reasons. One is that the insistent anti-historical line of Decon-
struction and of some other theories created an opposition. It is no accident that varieties 
of neo-Marxist criticism gained strength as a kind of intellectual antidote to Deconstruc-
tion, for whatever else Marxism may be, it is founded on a view of history. Another 
reason involves the rise and maturation of women's studies. The effort to recover and 
publish what women had written, but was long ignored, involved historical research. 
And the efforts to explain both its being ignored and to what ends it was written 
required historical explanation. 
Among other reasons that might be added there are two of interest. One is that 
the study of literary theories and the explanations of what they meant showed that the 
theories themselves had precursors and histories of development. The anti-historical 
was itself a historical phenomenon. More importantly, the formerly dominant theory 
did not allow for matters of great importance. These are human concerns that I shall 
call community, responsibility, and trust. To lose our common ground with other peo-
ple, to lose our action and responsibility for it, and to lose belief in each other—these 
are losses too great for many people to wish to endure. 
There are many new kinds of history come into being. One, termed the New 
Historicism, began in English renaissance studies. 4 Varieties of neo-Marxism and 
women's studies have already been mentioned. It is proper to term these new kinds of 
history, because they differ from the kind of literary history practiced before the entry 
of literary theory into our thought and writing. One may say that historical study is 
now more theoretical than before, more problematic, and-at its best-more difficult. 
Most of these remarks have been meant to show as much. And since my remarks have 
grown more personal, I shall close with two further observations in kind. One is that 
many years ago-in 1961 -Robert H. Brower and I published a book on waka entitled 
Japanese Court Poetry. Considered today, that book really does belong to a generation 
ago, as is revealed by its combination of an older concept of literary history with a 
version of the anglo-American New Criticism. It would be most interesting to see what 
its replacement would be. The second observation is that for three years at Princeton 
we have had an informal group of people interested in issues involving both literature 
and history, along with the theoretical implications of the combination. Meetings of the 
group have brought together people from classics, art, East Asian studies, Near Eastern 
studies, and religion, but the strongest representation has been from history, comparative 
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literature, and English. That our mixed group should also be interested in theoretical 
issues shows that "theory" must also be considered pluralistically. It is appropriate, 
then, to end with a revision of my title : literatures, histories, literary histories, and 
theories. 
NOTES 
1) This is a version of a paper delivered at Kansai University on 23 June 1987. I wish to thank 
my generous hosts, particularly professor Akira Yasukawa, as also the attentive members of the 
audience for their questions. 
2) This does not mean that Carlyle's Fre叫 Revolutionhas been :fictionalized. It is a modern 
Western assumtpion, not an Asian one, that literature must be :fictional. For that matter, 
Aristotle says in the Poetics that tragic characters and literature may be either factual or :fictional 
(Ch. 9, beginning, on "names"). 
3) PMLA, 102 (1987), 283. 
4) See Jean Howard, "The New Historicism in Renaissance Studies", 恥 glishLiterary Renais-
sance, 16 (1986), 13-43. She reviews the work of a number of people identified with New 
Historicism. In the same issue (pp. 5ー 12),one of the group who is among the most widely 
cited, Louis Montrose, offers various principles and warnings. Some people criticize the New 
Historicism for being too ideological or for using too litle or too restricted a basis of evidence 
to sustain the generalizations built upon it. 
